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Abstract— Neural network based classifiers are still prone 
to manipulation through adversarial perturbations. State of the 
art attacks can overcome most of the defense or detection 
mechanisms suggested so far, and adversaries have the upper 
hand in this arms race. 
Adversarial examples are designed to resemble the normal 
input from which they were constructed, while triggering an 
incorrect classification. This basic design goal leads to a 
characteristic spatial behavior within the context of Activation 
Spaces, a term coined by the authors to refer to the hyperspaces 
formed by the activation values of the network’s layers. Within 
the output of the first layers of the network, an adversarial 
example is likely to resemble normal instances of the source 
class, while in the final layers such examples will diverge 
towards the adversary’s target class. The steps below enable us 
to leverage this inherent “shift” from one class to another in 
order to form a novel adversarial example detector. We 
construct Euclidian spaces out of the activation values of each 
of the deep neural network layers. Then, we induce a set of k-
nearest neighbor classifiers (k-NN), one per activation space of 
each neural network layer, using the non-adversarial examples. 
We leverage those classifiers to produce a sequence of class 
labels for each nonperturbed input sample and estimate the a 
priori probability for a class label change between one 
activation space and another. Training our detector with only 
normal input follows the principles of anomaly detection, 
aiming to make our method future ready for as yet unknown 
attack methods. During the detection phase we compute a 
sequence of classification labels for each input using the trained 
classifiers. We then estimate the likelihood of those 
classification sequences and show that adversarial sequences 
are far less likely than normal ones. 
We evaluated our detection method against the state of the 
art C&W attack method, using two image classification datasets 
(MNIST, CIFAR-10) which are commonly used for adversarial 
evaluation. Our evaluation results show that our detector 
achieves an AUC of 0.95 for the CIFAR-10 dataset, with only 
a marginal increase in the computational complexity.  
Keywords— Adversarial Perturbations, Detector, 
Activation Spaces 
I. INTRODUCTION  
State of the art neural network based classifiers outperform 
humans in a wide range of tasks [31], [33]. However, they 
remain extremely vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. 
Following the initial discovery of adversarial examples in deep 
neural networks [32] an array of increasingly more powerful 
attack methods have been suggested [6], [25]. Adversarial 
perturbations were refined to the point that a single pixel can 
control the output of a convolutional neural network (CNN) 
based classifier [30], and recent research demonstrated how 
generic perturbations can be applied as is to a wide range of 
inputs and network architectures [19]. 
Furthermore [23], coined the term adversarial transferability, 
demonstrating that it is possible to launch an attack against a 
given network using perturbation patterns devised on a surrogate 
network. This discovery opened the door to black box attacks. 
Finally, the applicability of adversarial examples in the real 
world was shown in various studies [2], [15], [28].  
Naturally, significant research efforts have been invested to 
try to counter such attacks, either by increasing classifier 
resilience [12], [18], [20], [26], [27] or attempting to 
differentiate adversarial examples from normal instances [9], 
[11], [29]. In what has evolved into an arms race, adversaries 
clearly have the upper hand. State of the art attacks are able to 
overcome most existing defense mechanisms [3], [6] and 
adversarial example detection algorithms [7].  
Two core principles underlie of all adversarial attack 
methods against deep neural networks: 1) adversarial examples 
should closely resemble normal input, and 2) perturbation 
should give the adversary complete control of the classification 
results. In this work we propose a novel adversarial example 
detection method that is based on the dynamics of activation 
values triggered by each of a neural network classifier’s layers. 
Our proposed detection method aims to identify behavior 
patterns that result from the two core principles listed above. We 
show that the inherent qualities of adversarial examples result in 
substantially different activation pattern sequences compared to 
normal inputs. 
We evaluate our detection method using state of the art attack 
methods and classifier models, and show that it can effectively 
overcome adversarial inputs without significantly increasing 
computational complexity. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
provides general background regarding adversarial machine 
learning, including state of the art methods for attack, defense, 
and detection. Section III presents our proposed detection 
method, which is empirically evaluated in Section Error! 
Reference source not found.. Finally, we discuss the 
limitations of the proposed method in Section V, and provide 
final notes and future research directions in Section VI. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we provide the background needed for 
understanding our detection approach. We briefly explain the 
existing algorithms for crafting adversarial examples, and 
discuss their effect over deep neural network based classifiers. 
We then survey known defense and detection mechanisms, in 
order to list the existing gaps and derive the requirements of any 
new detection method. 
A. Crafting Adversarial Attacks 
Given a neural network based classifier 𝑓(∙), an input vector 
𝑥, and true class label 𝑌, crafting an adversarial example 𝑥′ =
(𝑥 +  𝛿) translates to identifying an adversarial perturbation 𝛿 
such that 
𝑓(𝑥′) ≠ 𝑌 
𝑠. 𝑡. ‖𝛿‖𝑝 < 𝜀 
(1) 
where 𝜀  is used to ensure the adversarial perturbation is 
undetectable, and 𝑝 is a specified distance metric. The choice of 
the most suitable distance metric is dependent on the 
classification task and context. As we deal with image 
classification, perturbation detectability is dependent on human 
perception and is not well defined using mathematical terms. 
However the 𝐿0, 𝐿2 and 𝐿∞ distance metrics are commonly used 
in this context as a proxy for human perception. 𝐿0 measures the 
number of perturbed features within 𝛿 (e.g., image pixels), 𝐿2 
measures the perturbation’s Euclidian norm, and 𝐿∞ measures 
the maximal change to any of the input features.  
Various optimization methods for solving the constraints in 
(1) have been suggested in recent years. Typically the methods 
include computation of f(X), calculation of the loss gradient, and 
one or more steps during which the input is perturbed based on 
the gradient, in order to maximize the loss. 
Attack methods are often divided into two classes. The 
approach described above is commonly known as a non-targeted 
attack. Here the attacker wishes to deviate from the true class 
label but does not care about which other class is chosen. 
Targeted attacks are more powerful in the sense the attacker 
gains full control over the classifier’s output. Perturbation is 
constructed to assign a predetermined class label to the 
adversary input. 
The implementation details of targeted attacks are quite 
similar to those of the non-targeted ones, except that in the 
targeted case perturbation is formed based on the gradient in the 
direction of the target class. 
1) False Sense of Certainty 
In [21] the authors have created images that appear as random 
noise to a human observer but are actually carefully crafted 
adversarial examples. The optimization method used for 
creating those adversarial examples follows the guidelines 
presented in Section II.A, however instead of starting with valid 
input obtained from the testing set, a random starting point was 
used. The researchers’ main contribution was in addressing the 
issue of model certainty. Using a state of the art ImageNet 
classifier, the authors showed that model certainty does not 
reflect reality when processing adversarial examples. Despite 
being fooled by the adversarial examples, the classifier was over 
99% certain that the random noise images represented a valid 
object category. 
This research highlighted a key aspect of adversarial 
manipulation – certainty estimations provided by deep neural 
network based classifiers cannot be trusted. 
2) Fast Gradient Sign Method and Basic Iterative Method 
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10] was the first 
computationally efficient method for crafting adversarial 
examples. It is a single-step attack, requiring a single iteration of 
gradient calculation and perturbing each of the input features by 
a magnitude of 𝜀 in the direction of the loss gradient. Formally  
𝑥′ =  𝑥 + 𝜀 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑥 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑌)) (2) 
where 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑌)  represent’s the classifier’s loss given an input 
vector 𝑥 and true class label 𝑌.  
The basic iterative method (BIM) [16] is an immediate 
extension of FGSM, where instead of performing a single step 
in the direction of the gradient, ℎ  smaller steps of size 𝛾  are 
performed so that ℎ ∗ 𝛾 =  𝜀. This iterative approach allows a 
more refined perturbation based on the curvature of the 
classification manifold. 
More recent research has presented effective 
countermeasures for both FGSM and BIM [5].  
3) Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Attack 
In [6] the authors recently presented an attack method 
(commonly referred to as the C&W attack) that can overcome 
most, if not all, known defense mechanisms. It was specifically 
designed to overcome defensive distillation [26], which was 
considered unbeatable at the time. Their work includes a set of 
three attack methods (one for each commonly used distance 
metric), all derived from the same iterative optimization method. 
The result is a powerful set of attacks that are currently 
considered state of the art attacks for which there are no known 
defense or detection mechanisms. 
The authors start by rephrasing the objective function used 
for crafting a targeted attack. Instead of requiring that  
𝑓(𝑥′) = 𝑡 
 
(3) 
where 𝑡  is the destination target class, they introduce a new 
objective function 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿) so that  
𝑓(𝑥 +  𝛿) = 𝑡 ↔ 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿) ≤ 0 (4) 
The original objective function presented in (3) is highly 
nonlinear making it hard to solve. Using the new representation, 
the authors were able to construct an equivalent optimization 
problem that is both easier to solve and controls the tradeoff 
between perturbation size and the need to mislead the classifier: 
min (‖𝛿‖𝑝 + 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿)) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑥 +  𝛿 ∈ [0,1]𝑛 
(5) 
By experimenting with different options for the function 𝑞 
and the tradeoff constant 𝑐, the authors were able to create a 
highly effective attack variant for each of the three commonly 
used distance metrics. 
4) Black Box Attacks and Adversarial Transferability 
The research of Szegedy, C. et al. [32] pointed to the fact that 
adversarial examples devised using one network often cause 
misclassification in a different network. This is true even if the 
two networks have different architecture and are trained using 
different datasets. This remarkable finding, which was later 
named Adversarial Transferability [23], opened the door for 
black box attacks against neural networks. 
Black box attacks can be launched by training a surrogate 
network for solving the same classification task as the target 
network, constructing adversarial examples against the surrogate 
network, and finally, for using those adversarial examples 
against the original target network. 
Given nowadays availability (through open-source licenses) 
of fully trained networks for a large variety of classification 
tasks, black box attacks allow an adversary to launch a 
successful attack even when the architecture and/or weights of 
the target network are unknown.  
B. Defense Mechanisms 
1) Adversarial Training 
Adversarial training is perhaps the most immediate line of 
defense against adversarial manipulations. It is based on 
iteratively training the classifier network using adversarial 
examples by 1) training a network to be sufficiently accurate 
over normal input, 2) generating adversarial examples, 3) 
augmenting the training input, and 4) fine-tuning the classifier. 
This simple approach has demonstrated greater model 
resilience than undefended classifiers, however there are a few 
shortcomings to this approach: 1) it is difficult to scale to 
classifiers that process high resolution inputs like ImageNet 
[16], 2) adversarial training based on weak attacks does not 
provide an adequate defense against stronger attacks [1], and 3) 
it is fairly easy to construct effective adversarial examples 
against a network that has already been trained to cope with 
some adversarial examples [19]. 
2) Defensive Distillation 
Distillation refers to the process of training one network over the 
softmax outputs of another network. Originally, this process was 
aimed at reducing the computational capacity associated with 
using a neural network. Hence, the distilled network includes a 
considerably lower number of neurons. 
Defensive distillation [26] makes use of the same training 
process in order to increase the resilience of the classifier 
network against adversarial examples. In this case the two 
networks share a common size and architecture, however the 
distilled network is trained using a high Distillation Temperature 
(described below). 
 Distillation modifies the softmax calculation by dividing 
both the numerator and the denominator by the distillation 
temperature 𝑇 as follows: 
𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥, 𝑇)𝑖 =  
𝑒𝑥𝑖/𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑗/𝑇𝑗

(6) 
With a temperature of one (6) reverts back to the standard 
softmax function. When distillation temperature decreases 
towards zero, softmax is pushed towards a “harder” max. The 
probability estimate of the most probable class increases towards 
one, while all other probabilities decrease towards zero.  
As distillation temperature increases, the value of 𝑇 becomes 
much larger than 𝑒𝑥𝑖 . Therefore, the softmax formula output 
approaches 1/N (with N denoting the number of classes). 
Training the distilled network using high temperature values, 
hence, forces it to increase the softmax input for the most 
probable class compared to the others. Informally we say that the 
classifier is required to be more certain about its classification 
output. Defensive distillation leverages this increased 
classification certainty for improving classifier resilience. It was 
considered a highly promising defense mechanism until Carlini 
and Wagner [6] designed an attack method that could effectively 
overcome it. 
3) Gradient Obfuscation 
As attack methods are commonly based on the calculation of the 
loss gradient, defense or detection algorithms should attempt to 
distort or eliminate the gradient calculated by an attacker. The 
term gradient obfuscation [24] refers to any attempt to prevent 
the gradient calculation, distort the gradient result, or eliminate 
the gradient altogether. Gradient obfuscation is considered a 
mandatory requirement, although not a sufficient one [3] for any 
defense or detection mechanism. As long as the defense 
mechanism is based on some differentiable function, an 
adversary can successfully attack both the classifier and defense 
models. This is done by treating the two models as a single, 
combined unit and computing adversarial perturbations that will 
fool them both [7]. Therefore, obfuscation aims to prevent such 
attacks. 
Notable examples of obfuscation use generative adversarial 
networks (GANs) in an attempt to remove adversarial noise [12], 
[18], [27], [29]. Assuming the availability of a sufficiently 
accurate generator network 𝐺(∙), those works first project the 
input onto the generator’s latent space and then use the 
generator’s output as input to the classifier network. Projection 
is performed by starting from a random point in the generator’s 
latent space and using several steps of gradient descent to find a 
latent vector 𝑧  that minimizes ‖𝑥 − 𝐺(𝑧)‖ . Once 𝑧  is found, 
𝐺(𝑧) is provided as input to the classifier network and 𝑓(𝐺(𝑧)) 
is used as the final classification result. 
Those methods are based on the assumption that no 
adversarial examples exist within the generator’s manifold. 
However, in a recent work [3] the authors were able to identify 
adversarial examples that are close enough to the original input 
and placed on the generator’s manifold.  
Although gradient obfuscation does not ensure the resilience 
of a defense mechanism, it is currently considered a mandatory 
requirement of such mechanisms. Any defense mechanism that 
allows direct gradient calculation can be easily overcome. 
Therefore, all recently suggested methods include some non-
differentiable elements, randomization, or other means of 
gradient elimination.  
C. Detecting Adversarial Examples 
Various attempts to detect adversarial examples based on 
statistical properties of the input have been suggested in recent 
years [34] In these studies, the authors have used various 
statistical tests and dimensionality reduction approaches in order 
to differentiate adversarial examples from normal input. 
However, as shown in [7], all of these approaches have failed to 
effectively detect state of the art attacks.  
Relatively little research has attempted to use the output of 
inner layers of the classifier network in order to detect and 
defend against adversarial examples. In [35] the authors have 
constructed SVM classifiers trained to detect adversarial 
examples based on the outputs of each of the network’s inner 
layers. They considered an input as normal, only when all of the 
SVM classifiers marked it as such. However, this defense 
method failed to defend against the more recent C&W attack, 
resulting in very high false positive rates [7].  
The authors of [36] augmented the classifier network with a 
secondary detector network that is fed by the output of the 
classifier’s convolution layers. However, given that the detector 
network is differentiable, more recent research [7] demonstrated 
that it is possible to form adversarial examples that 
simultaneously fool both the classifier and the detector. 
Recently, Papernot, N. & McDaniel, P. [17] attempted to 
address the false certainty issue and ensure that the classifier 
yields low confidence values when faced with adversarial input. 
The authors constructed a set of k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) 
classifiers based on the output of inner convolution layers. Then, 
for a given input, they collected the combined list of neighbors 
for all k-NN classifiers and used this list in order to calculate a 
more accurate confidence score. High variance within this list 
was translated to low confidence scores and vice versa. This 
work differs from our approach in two key respects: 1) The 
authors did not construct a detector. Instead their goal was to 
reduce the classifier’s reported certainty level when faced with 
adversarial input. 2) This work treats the outputs of all inner 
layers as a single monolithic block. The combined list of 
neighbors collected from all classifiers is used together for 
estimating the certainty score. Our approach analyzes the 
“spatial movements” of adversarial examples as they are 
processed by the different network layers. We leverage the 
individual class labels derived from each of the layers to form 
classification sequences and show that adversarial “movement 
patterns” reflected in those sequences are far less likely than 
normal ones.    
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In this section we describe our proposed method for 
detecting adversarial examples. We provide implementation 
details and evaluation results using image classification and 
convolution based classifiers, however we believe the same 
principles can be easily adapted to other domains as well. 
Our proposed solution is based on the Activation Space 
abstraction, a term coined by the authors to denote the 
hyperspace formed by the activation values of a given neural 
network layer.  
A. Notation and Terminology 
Building on the notation defined in Section II.A, we denote 
𝑓𝑖(∙) as the output of the ith neural network layer (0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙). 
𝑓0(∙)  represents the network’s input, while 𝑓𝑙(∙)  is the final 
softmax output. We also denote the activation space formed by 
the ith layer as 𝑉𝑖. 
B. Intuition and Motivation 
Assuming that our neural network classifier is accurate 
enough and thus it’s input is mapped to its correct class label by 
the final softmax layer. Using the activation space abstraction, 
we say that input is mapped into distinctive clusters within 𝑉𝑙 
(the activation space of the last layer). 
However, in the input space, such a separation does not 
usually exist. The role performed by the first group of neural 
network layers is therefore to differentiate between classes by 
mapping input into a high dimensionality space, so that instances 
of the same class are clustered in distinct subsections. Once 
separation has been achieved, the final layers of the network 
reduce dimensionality while preserving class based separation, 
until the number of outputs matches the number of classes in the 
final layer. 
Classes cannot be easily segmented within the input space, 
however we can assume that some classes are more easily 
separated than others – for instance images of dogs and cats 
might be harder to differentiate than those of dogs and airplanes. 
We can further assume that inputs that are closer in the input 
space require more processing (layers) in order to be separated 
correctly. 
Adversarial examples are designed to closely resemble 
normal inputs but cause the classifier to assign them an incorrect 
class label. Within the activation spaces of the lower network 
layers, we therefore expect adversarial examples to appear close 
to normal instances of their source class. Similarly, we expect 
them to be in proximity to instances of some other class in the 
activation spaces of the last set of network layers. 
All in all, we can expect different spatial behavior across 
various activation spaces when comparing normal and 
adversarial examples, and our proposed method is based on this 
line of thought. We track the process of class separation through 
the analysis of activation spaces and identify spatial patterns that 
differentiate adversarial examples from normal input. We 
believe those pattern differences are a result of the inherent 
nature of adversarial examples and hence expect our detection 
method to be resilient to future types of adversarial 
manipulations.  
  
 C. Detector Training 
The following section provides the implementation details of 
our detector. A pseudocode for the detector training process is 
provided in Algorithm 1 below. 
Constructing Activation Spaces: During detector training 
we construct a baseline for modeling the behavior of normal 
examples within the activation spaces. We allocate half of our 
training set for modeling the behavior of normal, unperturbed 
inputs (note that the input samples used for training the detector 
were not used for training the classifier). We feed those inputs 
into the network and compute the activation values of each 
layer. We then construct a Euclidian activation space for each 
layer by projecting layer activation output using principal 
component analysis (PCA).  
In this case the use of PCA serves a dual purpose: 1) it 
reduces dimensionality and in doing so removes correlated 
outputs and reduces the computation load, and 2) it forms a 
Euclidian hyperspace where axes are perpendicular to one 
another allowing distance calculations.  
Training a Dedicated k-NN Classifier for Each 
Activation Space: Next, we train a dedicated k-NN classifier 
for each of the activation spaces, mapping points of that space 
into one of the network’s class labels. It is important to note that 
the k-NN classification algorithm is non-differentiable. This 
algorithm provides us with the gradient obfuscation needed in 
order to block all simple, gradient based attacks against our 
detector.  
Algorithm 1: Detector Training 
input:   
 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 – training input set 
 𝑓(∙)   – trained classifier network of 𝑙 layers 
 𝛼   – maximal allowed detector false positive rate (FPR) 
 
output: 
 𝑉   - activation spaces 
 𝐶   - k-NN classifier for each activation space 
 𝑃𝑠   - a priori class label switching probability 
 𝐶𝑂   - detector’s log likelihood cutoff value 
 
logic: 
 # Compute Euclidian activation spaces for each layer 
 𝑉𝑖 ← 𝑃𝐶𝐴. 𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛)) 
 # Train a k-NN classifier for each activation space 
 𝐶𝑖 ← 𝑘𝑁𝑁. 𝑓𝑖𝑡 (𝑉𝑖 (𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛)) , k = 5) 
 # Assign input samples with a sequence of class labels 
 ?̂?𝑖 ←  𝐶𝑖 . 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 (𝑉𝑖 (𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛))) 
 
 # Calculate the a priori probability for a classification 
 # change at the i  position of a sequence 
 𝑃𝑠
𝑖 ← 𝑃(?̂?𝑖  ≠  ?̂?𝑖−1) ∀ 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑙] 
 
 # Construct adversarial examples 
 𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← 𝐶&𝑊(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛) 
 
 # Calculate class switching Bayesian log likelihood 
 For each 𝑥 in 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛  ∪  𝑋𝑎𝑑𝑣: 
  𝐿𝐿𝑥 ← 0 
  For each layer 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙: 
   If ?̂?𝑖(𝑥)  ≠  ?̂?𝑖−1(𝑥) then 
    𝐿𝐿𝑥  ←  𝐿𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔( 𝑃𝑠
𝑖) 
   Else 
    𝐿𝐿𝑥  ←  𝐿𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 −  𝑃𝑠
𝑖) 
 
 # Calculate the cutoff log likelihood value. Choose an 
 # appropriate threshold value by using a ROC curve 
 𝐶𝑂 ← 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑃𝑅 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐹𝑃𝑅 <  𝛼 
 
 
Estimating A Priori Class Label Switching Probability: 
Based on the trained k-NN classifiers, we assign each input 
sample with a sequence of class labels (one label per each 
classifier) and further use those sequences for estimating the a 
priori probability for a class label change between each pair of 
adjacent network layers. Intuitively one can expect this a priori 
probability to be relatively high within the first activation 
spaces and to gradually decrease towards the last ones. This is 
a result of the improvement in class separation as we move from 
one network layer to another. We can also expect adversarial 
examples to demonstrate label switching patterns that are 
substantially different than those of normal ones. This is the 
result of the inherent goal of adversarial examples, and our 
experiments provide empirical evidence to support that 
intuition.  
Computing the Likelihood of Class Label Sequences: 
Given the a priori label switching probability estimates we can 
compute the likelihood of a given sequence. When calculating 
likelihood values, we follow the naïve Bayes principle and 
assume that the predictions made by our k-NN classifiers are 
independent of one another.  
We perturb the remaining half of the training samples using 
the C&W attack, feed the adversarial examples into the network, 
calculate the corresponding activation values, and ultimately 
assign each adversarial example with a sequence of class labels 
as we did for the normal examples.  
Finally, we calculate the likelihood of each of the normal and 
adversarial sequences and choose a cutoff value to differentiate 
one group from the other. 
Hyper Parametrization and Implementation Notes:  
 The number of PCA components used when forming the 
Euclidian activation spaces affects detector accuracy. 
The results reported in following section are based on 
using the first 100 PCA components. The number of 
components to use was chosen through trial and error.  
For layers with more than 100 output neurons, we 
reduce dimensionality to 100 PCA components. For 
layers with fewer output neurons, we maintain the 
original dimensionality but use PCA to form Euclidian 
spaces.  
 Our experiments indicate that the number of neighbors 
used to train the k-NN classifiers do not have a major 
effect on detector accuracy. We therefore report detector 
accuracy results using five nearest neighbors (k=5). 
 Under the naïve Bayes assumption, likelihood can be 
computed as the multiplication product of the 
probabilities associated with the observed class 
sequences. However, when dealing with deep neural 
networks those sequences can grow fairly long. 
Multiplying the associated probabilities will therefore 
quickly exhaust the accuracy of floating point 
calculations.  
In order to overcome this computational limitation, we 
compute the log likelihood (the sum of probability logs) 
instead of the multiplication product. 
 Our detector is based on estimating the log likelihood of 
label switching sequences assigned to normal examples 
and treating those as a baseline for comparison against 
newly provided inputs. Following anomaly detection 
practices by training the detector using only normal 
examples is aimed at increasing the efficiency of our 
detector against as yet unknown adversarial 
manipulation algorithms. 
D. Detector Evaluation 
Once the detector has been trained, evaluation is rather 
straight forward. We feed each new set of input images into the 
neural network classifier and compute the activation values for 
empirical evaluation. We use the trained k-NN classifiers to 
produce a sequence of class labels, compute the log likelihood 
of the observed class switches between one activation space and 
another, and ultimately compare the likelihood score to the cut 
off value. 
E. Evaluation Framework 
We conduct our experiments using the Python ecosystem. 
We use Keras with a TensorFlow backend as our deep learning 
framework, and the CleverHans [22] library for crafting 
adversarial perturbations.  
We test our proposed method using two benchmark datasets 
- the MNIST handwritten digits [17] and CIFAR-10 image 
classification [14] datasets, as summarized in TABLE I.  
For MNIST classification we use the textbook CNN described 
in (Keras MNIST CNN Tutorial, https://github.com/keras-
team/keras/blob/master/examples/mnist_cnn.py). This 
classifier network includes six layers and roughly 1.2M 
trainable parameters, and achieves 99.1% accuracy for the 
unperturbed testing set. For CIFAR-10 we use a VGG16 
network adjusted from (https://github.com/keras-
team/keras/blob/master/examples/mnist_cnn.py). This network 
includes 34 layers, accounting for roughly 15M trainable 
parameters, and achieves 93.6% accuracy 
IV. RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
A. Evaluating the MNIST Dataset 
We follow the steps described in Section III.C, to test the 
validity of our approach using the MNIST dataset. We train the 
CNN on the predefined training set and use half of the testing 
samples for training our detector. 
We form a targeted C&W attack [6] using the remaining 5K 
testing samples. A random target class is chosen for each input 
image. 
Using the attack parameters specified in 0 we were able to 
manipulate the classification of all input samples to our 
randomly selected target class. 
 We start by assessing our intuition with regard to the a priori 
label switching probability. As shown in Fig. 1, the probability 
of a label switch decreases towards the final network layers, 
which seem to support our intuition. However, MNIST presents 
a rather simple classification task. This is apparent by the 
relatively low switching probability for the first layers, as well 
as by this simple model’s near perfect classification result. 
With our intuition affirmed, we move on to calculating the 
log likelihood of class switching for normal and adversarial 
examples. As is clear from Fig. 1, the likelihood of the 
adversarial switching sequences is considerably lower than that 
of normal ones. This is a result of the inherent nature of 
adversarial examples. Namely, they force a class switch in the 
last layers, where the a priori probability for a switch is very 
low. 
The last step for constructing the detector is choosing a 
likelihood threshold value. Fig. 2 provides a sensitivity analysis 
of different threshold values using an ROC curve. In this 
context, true positive refers to correctly identified adversarial 
examples, while false positive refers to cases of normal images 
that were incorrectly classified as adversarial. As is illustrated 
in Fig. 2, our detector achieves an AUC of 0.91 when applied 
to all testing instances. 
B. Evaluating the CIFAR-10 Dataset 
The MNIST dataset cannot prove the validity of a defense 
mechanism by itself [7]. Some defense mechanisms have been  
shown to be efficient in blocking/detecting adversarial 
perturbations against the MNIST dataset, but they failed to 
operate on more complex use cases. Therefore, we repeated the 
experiment using the CIFAR-10 dataset. 
The increased complexity of the CIFAR-10 classification 
task is reflected in the inner structure of the CNN required to 
solve it: there are many more layers and over 10 times more 
trainable parameters, compared to the MNIST CNN.As in the 
case of MNIST, we used a randomly selected target for each 
input sample. The C&W attack parameters utilized in this case 
are listed in 0It is worth noting that we employ a much stronger 
attack configuration in this case, with more iterations, greater 
attack confidence, and a lower learning rate. Using this 
configuration, we were able to achieve 100% success in 
manipulating classification to our selected target class.  
Algorithm 2: Detector Evaluation 
input: 
𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙  – input for evaluation 
𝑓(∙)   – trained classifier network of 𝑙 layers 
𝑉   - activation spaces 
𝐶   - k-NN classifier per each activation space 
𝑃𝑠   - a priori class label switching probability 
𝐶𝑂   - detector’s log likelihood cutoff value 
 
output: 
Normal/Adversarial detector decision 
 
logic: 
# Compute a class label sequence for the evaluated input 
For each layer 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙: 
 
# Project activation value to the i  activation space 
𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙) ← 𝑉
𝑖 . 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 (𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙)) 
 
# Compute the i  class label 
?̂?𝑖(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙) ←  𝐶
𝑖 . 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡(𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙)) 
 
# Calculate the Bayesian log likelihood of the class label 
# sequence 
𝐿𝐿𝑥 ← 0 
For each layer 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙: 
If ?̂?𝑖(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙)  ≠  ?̂?
𝑖−1(𝑋𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙) then 
𝐿𝐿𝑥  ←  𝐿𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔( 𝑃𝑠
𝑖) 
Else 
𝐿𝐿𝑥  ←  𝐿𝐿𝑥 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 −  𝑃𝑠
𝑖) 
 
# Compare log likelihood against the cutoff value 
If 𝐿𝐿𝑥 < 𝐶𝑂 
return Adversarial 
Else 
return Normal 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  DATASETS, CLASSIFIER NETWORKS, AND ACCURACY 
FIGURES 
Dataset Accuracy Input Train/ 
Test 
Images 
Network 
Architecture 
MNIST 99.1% 28x28 
grayscal
e images 
60K / 10K Textbook 
solution (6 
layers, 1.2M 
parameters) 
CIFAR-
10 
93.6% 32x32 
RGB 
images 
50K / 10K VGG16 (34 
layers, 15M 
parameters) 
 
TABLE II.  C&W ATTACK PARAMETERS FOR THE MNIST AND CIFAR-
10 EXPERIMENTS 
Attack Parameter MNIST CIFAR-10 
Iteration Count 200 1000 
Learning Rate 0.1 0.01 
Initial Constant 
(for Binary 
Search) 
10 0.001 
Confidence 0 5 
Binary Search 
Steps 
1 9 
 
As a first analysis step, we provide a visual analysis of the 
expressive power of activation spaces. We projected each of the 
activation spaces of the CIFAR-10 classifier network onto a 2D 
plot using t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-
SNE) [38]. t-SNE is an unsupervised dimensionality reduction 
method that is particularly suitable for visualizing high 
dimensionality datasets. This method attempts to preserve, 
within the projected visualization, the relative distance from 
each data point to its neighbors. As a result, the distance 
between every two data points on the t-SNE visualization is 
correlative to their distance in the original dataset. It should be 
noted, however, that the absolute position within the 
visualization is meaningless.  
Fig. 3. includes The t-SNE visualization of every fourth 
activation space in the CIFAR-10 classifier. The colors 
represent different true class labels. Notably, the t-SNE  
algorithm itself is unsupervised. The true class labels are only 
used for visualization and are not used as part of the t-SNE 
projection process. The gradual increase in class separation is 
clearly evident, supporting our initial intuition. Starting from an 
intertwined mixture of colors in the t-SNE visualization of the 
first activation space, and ending with distinctive color areas in 
the t-SNE visualization of the last activation space.  
Next we have tested the performance of our detector over 
the CIFAR-10 dataset. The results of this experiment are 
presented in Fig. 4. As we anticipated, a priori label switching 
probability decreases towards the last layers of the network. In 
contrast, adversarial switching probability remains much higher 
through most of the network’s layers. Those vastly different 
switching patterns yield substantially lower log likelihood 
values for the adversarial examples. 
 
Fig. 1. Results on the MNIST dataset. Top - class switching probability for 
normal and adversarial input; bottom - log likelihood of class switching 
sequences.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Detector ROC curve for the MNIST dataset. 
 
 
Testing the correlation between the calculated log likelihood 
and the perturbation norm showed that the two are practically 
independent of one another (Pearson correlation of 0.009). This 
supports our claim that our detector is based on an inherent 
quality of adversarial examples, as opposed to some visual 
artifact, and increases our confidence regarding the validity of 
our method against future attacks. 
As previously mentioned, the last step for constructing the 
detector is choosing a likelihood threshold value. Fig. 5 
provides a sensitivity analysis of different threshold values 
using an ROC curve. Our detector achieves an AUC of 0.92 
when applied to all testing instances.  
An in depth investigation of the false positive cases reveals 
that they are largely associated with cases of misclassification 
by the original classifier network. Whereas on average our 
network provides incorrect classification for 6.3% of all 
examples, it misclassifies roughly 30-40% of all false positive 
examples (depending on the threshold value).
We see that incorrectly classified images exhibit a large number 
of label switches and a high rate of switches in the last 10 layers 
of the network, similar to adversarial examples. This further 
strengthens our understanding of the role played by the different 
layers of the DNN. 
Replotting the ROC using only correctly classified 
examples shows an impressive AUC of 0.95.  
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
While our proposed method only marginally increases the 
computation load of the original classifier, its memory 
requirements are proportional to the depth of the original 
classifier network. In the case of modern convolutional 
networks (e.g., ResNet) these memory requirements can 
increase significantly. 
Our detector uses a set of k-NN classifiers as a form of 
gradient obfuscation. Ideally, we would like to have an all DNN 
solution making the detector an integral part of the classifier 
 
 
Fig. 3. t-SNE based visualization of the CIFAR-10 classifier activation spaces 
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 VI. SUMMARY 
In this work we present a novel method for detecting 
adversarial perturbations based on activation spaces, the 
hyperspaces formed by the activation outputs of the network’s 
inner layers. We demonstrate the potential value of our 
approach using two commonly used verification datasets 
(MNIST and CIFAR-10) and C&W, the state of the art attack 
method [6]. Our proposed detector achieves an AUC of 0.95 on 
the CIFAR-10 dataset. 
We designed our detector taking into account the inherent 
nature of adversarial examples. Our experiments provide initial 
evidence that we were able to detect spatial behavior in 
activation spaces that is related to this nature. Our proposed 
detector leverages a set of k-NN classifiers trained on the 
activation outputs of each layer of the neural network. We 
measure the a priori probability of class label changes between 
every two consecutive layers and use this set of probabilities to 
compute the likelihood of the entire classification sequence. 
The k-NN classification algorithm is non-differentiable, hence 
preventing simple attacks against our detector model. 
In an attempt to make our algorithm future ready for 
handling as yet unknown attack methods, we compute our 
likelihood baseline estimates using only normal, unperturbed 
input. 
Intuitively, we hypothesized that DNN classifiers begin by 
clustering input samples in a high dimensional space and then 
reduce representation dimensionality towards the final layer, 
while preserving class separation. Our experiments support this 
intuition in two ways: 1) the a priori label changing probability 
decreases asymptotically towards the final layers of the 
network, and 2) false positive detection is tightly coupled with 
classification accuracy. Normal inputs that are misclassified by 
the original neural network are very likely to trigger a false 
positive classification by our detector model.  
In the future we plan to extend our approach to include 
additional network types such as RNNs, by leveraging of the 
CNN to RNN transferability. We would like to explore ways of 
using an all DNN implementation of our proposed method in 
an attempt to start bridging the gap between human perception 
and DNN based classification. We also plan to continue to 
explore the nature of adversarial examples in different content 
domains with various classifier architectures. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Results on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Top - class switching probability 
for normal and adversarial inputs; Bottom - log likelihood of class 
switching sequences. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Detector ROC curve on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Green represents the 
results filtered for inputs that are correctly classified by the CIFAR-10 
network. Blue represents all testing inputs without filtering. 
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